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Abstract
Background: The term "evidence-based medicine" (or EBM) was introduced about ten years ago,
and there has been considerable debate about the value of EBM. However, this debate has
sometimes been obscured by a lack of conceptual clarity concerning the nature and status of EBM.
Discussion: First, we note that EBM proponents have obscured the current debate by defining
EBM in an overly broad, indeed almost vacuous, manner; we offer a clearer account of EBM and its
relation to the alternative approaches to medicine. Second, while EBM proponents commonly cite
the philosophical work of Thomas Kuhn and claim that EBM is a Kuhnian 'paradigm shift,' we argue
that such claims are seriously mistaken and unduly polarize the EBM debate. Third, we suggest that
it is much more fruitful to understand the relationship between EBM and its alternatives in light of
a different philosophical metaphor: W.V. Quine's metaphor of the web of belief. Seen in this way,
we argue that EBM is an approach to medical practice that is indeed importantly different from the
alternatives.
Summary: We can have a more productive debate about the value of EBM by being clearer about
the nature of EBM and its relationship to alternative approaches to medicine.
Background
Over the past decade, the term "evidence-based medicine"
(or EBM) has gained considerable currency. EBM has been
described as a "paradigm shift" [1] that will "change med-
ical practice in the years ahead."[2] Some suggest that the
principles of EBM should be part of the standard training
of all physicians and that those physicians who violate its
precepts should ultimately face license suspension.[3]
Critics of EBM claim that "there is no evidence (and
unlikely ever to be) that EBM provides better medical
care," and that EBM is simply "following its own political
agenda."[4] Other critics use even harsher rhetoric, claim-
ing that EBM's assumptions are "absurd" and "irra-
tional".[5] Some commentators claim a middle ground by
saying that EBM and other approaches should be "harmo-
nized".[6]
The critics argue that EBM proponents overemphasize the
value of clinical trials. These critics suggest that there are
other aspects to medicine. Some note the fundamental
role of basic science in understanding the physiologic
mechanisms of the body, the biology of disease, and the
cellular targets of drugs.[5,7] There are also critics who
emphasize the value of clinical experience and the judg-
ment of individual physicians; [7–10] these critics some-
times emphasize the art of medicine, [10] and contrast
this with the science of medicine, or they speak of techne
vs. theory or compassion vs. reason. And other critics
might argue that there are circumstances in which obser-
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vational studies (or outcome studies)are a better choice
than clinical trials [11].
The questions raised by this debate are fundamental: How
should physicians practice medicine? Should they do so
in accordance with the principles of EBM? If so, how
should this be accomplished? How should health care
dollars best be spent? While there has been considerable
debate about these questions, it seems to us that the
debate also involves some confusion. The confusion is a
good indication that some conceptual clarification is in
order, and that is our principal aim in this paper. Our
philosophical analysis will be limited to conceptual and
epistemological issues; there are ethical issues that arise in
the practice of evidence-based medicine, but we will not
be addressing those questions.
Philosophers distinguish different types of questions. The
questions just raised are, in this context, the basic ques-
tions, or the first order questions. By contrast, second order
questions are questions about the first order questions,
e.g., questions about the concepts employed in the first
order questions. We can also refer to the second order
questions as conceptual questions. In the present context,
the second order questions would include: what is EBM?
What are the alternatives to EBM? What is the relationship
between EBM and the alternative approaches to medi-
cine? Does EBM represent a paradigm shift? Without clear
and compelling answers to these second order questions,
the debate about the first order questions will be an exer-
cise in futility. Obviously, if both sides in the debate have
different ideas about what EBM is, then the opposing
sides will be talking past each other when they argue
about whether or not EBM should be practiced. We have
to agree on what we are talking about before we can make
progress on the question of whether it is a good thing.
This seems obvious, but in the first section of our discus-
sion we will argue that some overly broad characteriza-
tions of EBM have in fact done much to obscure the
debate. In section two, we will argue that it is unhelpful
and misleading to portray EBM as a paradigm shift and
that such portrayals have polarized the debate in an unfor-
tunate way.
We will claim that it is much more useful to see EBM and
its alternatives in light of a different philosophical picture:
W.V. Quine's web of belief metaphor.[12] Seen in this
light, we can see that EBM is an approach to medical prac-
tice that is indeed importantly different from the alterna-
tives. The Quinean metaphor helps us to understand these
differences, and this in turn puts us in a position to evalu-
ate much more effectively the first order normative ques-
tions about how medicine ought to be practiced. We will
begin in the third section by explaining certain aspects of
his view that are most relevant to the EBM debate before
applying the view in the fourth and final section.
Discussion
What is EBM?
As has been noticed by others [7,13], the debate about the
value of EBM has been muddied by an unfortunate ten-
dency to define the term "evidence-based medicine" in an
overly broad manner. For example, here is one definition
of EBM that has some claim to being authoritative: "The
conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual
patients" [14]. In a similar vein, Brian Haynes writes
"Advocates of evidence-based medicine want clinicians
and consumers to pay attention to the best findings from
health care research that are both valid and ready for clin-
ical application".[15] Taken at face value, these defini-
tions seem merely to say that EBM is the wise use of the
best evidence available. Given that characterization alone,
it would be astonishing that there is any dispute about
EBM. It would be equally astonishing that anyone could
think EBM, defined in this manner, revolutionary or even
useful. After all, who could possibly be opposed to using
the best evidence wisely?
The very term "evidence-based medicine" seems similarly
vacuous – as if any alternative to EBM means doing med-
icine based on something other than evidence. Even
homeopaths base their treatments on evidence of a sort,
and we suspect that homeopaths would even claim that
they are conscientiously and explicitly using the best evi-
dence available. Of course they are wrong about the latter
claim, but nothing in these standard definitions of EBM
tells us why homeopathy fails to be evidence-based med-
icine. Furthermore, few would suggest that the very idea of
using evidence in medicine constitutes a revolutionary
paradigm shift. Perhaps advocates of the term "evidence-
based medicine" have a philosophical theory of evidence,
a theory according to which everything that has passed for
evidence prior to the EBM movement was not evidence at
all. However, if they have such a theory, we have not seen
it expressed.
In the Background section, we mentioned a number of
criticisms that have been raised against EBM. With such
critics, we have the beginnings of an intelligible debate,
for we have several reasonably distinct approaches to
intervention questions, and we can ask substantive ques-
tions about the strengths and weaknesses of each, and we
can ask which should be used when or how they should
be combined. The present point is simply this: there is a
tendency for some proponents of EBM to duck these ques-
tions and avoid this debate by defining "evidence-based
medicine" such that it includes the best possible combina-
tion of basic science, clinical experience, and clinical tri-BMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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als. In so doing, the proponents of EBM come awfully
close to simply defining EBM as the best way to practice
medicine, whatever that may be. In other words, they
respond to the second order conceptual question ("what
is EBM?") by saying that EBM is whatever approach to
medicine best answers the first order normative question
("how ought we to practice medicine?"). The proponents
of EBM thereby give the illusion of having answered both
sets of questions when in fact they have answered neither.
They thus walk away from an important and substantive
debate.
We emphasize that our concern about the definition of
EBM stems not merely from an academic desire for philo-
sophical clarity. Our concern is eminently practical: we
believe that the debate between EBM and alternative
approaches is important and can change medical practice.
But if EBM is explicitly defined in a way that is essentially
vacuous, the debate will be unproductive. If this debate is
to yield fruit, we must therefore clarify what we mean
when we speak of EBM.
The heart of EBM is the use of randomized controlled tri-
als (RCTs) to determine the safety and efficacy of interven-
tions, e.g. treatment, diagnosis, and prevention. Of
course, EBM advocates have taken care to allow a role for
other factors beyond evidence from RCTs. In particular,
one must take into account the clinical state and circum-
stances of the patient, as well as the patient's own prefer-
ences and actions.[14,16–18] Even for EBM practitioners,
the research evidence is but one component of medical
decision making. But of course alternative approaches to
medical practice will also take into account the patient's
clinical state and values; this is not what separates EBM
from the other approaches. What separates EBM from
other approaches is the priority it gives to certain forms of
evidence, and according to EBM the most highly prized
form of evidence comes from RCTs (including systematic
reviews) and meta-analyses of RCTs. So, for the purposes
of this paper, we will take the term "evidence-based med-
icine" to refer essentially to the practice of taking RCTs as
the strongly preferred form of medical evidence.
Is EBM a paradigm shift?
Proponents have hailed EBM as a "paradigm shift" or
"revolution", in the sense of those words put forward by
historian of science Thomas Kuhn.[19] At the same time,
Brian Haynes acknowledges that "most scientists and EBM
advocates are ignorant of the philosophy of science and
give little or no thought to constructing a philosophical
basis for their activities."[15] Indeed, Haynes goes on to
write that "One hopes that the attention of philosophers
will be drawn to these questions" [15]. In that spirit, we
want to examine more closely the claim that EBM is a
Kuhnian paradigm shift. The Kuhnian metaphor is famil-
iar to philosophers, but its implications are presumably
less familiar to physicians. We have nothing against a met-
aphorical characterization of EBM and its alternatives;
well-chosen metaphors can do much to illuminate con-
ceptual (i.e., second-order) questions, and thereby can
help us answer the normative (i.e., first-order) questions.
However, we will suggest that the Kuhnian metaphor is a
poor one and serves to obscure more than it illuminates.
According to Kuhn, "normal science" takes place when the
scientific community shares what Kuhn calls a "para-
digm". A paradigm is "entire constellation of beliefs, val-
ues, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a
given community"[19]. The paradigm represents the
shared context, and within that context, the scientists will
work on remaining puzzles or problems. But within nor-
mal science, scientists do not seek "major substantive nov-
elties"; [19] rather, "Mopping-up operations are what
engage most scientists throughout their careers".[19]
Kuhn suggests that the history of science is mostly consti-
tuted by periods of normal science. However, sometimes
an accepted paradigm undergoes a crisis, followed by a
'scientific revolution' which overthrows the old paradigm
and replaces it with a new paradigm. With the new para-
digm, the scientific community has a new set of assump-
tions and a new set of puzzles to be solved. Kuhn refers to
these revolutions as "changes of world view"; he suggests
that "after a revolution scientists are responding to a dif-
ferent world".[19] Somewhat less metaphorically, Kuhn
says that the post-revolutionary paradigm is, at least to
some extent, incommensurable with the previous paradigm.
Is EBM a paradigm shift? To answer this question, we have
to specify the alternative with which we are comparing
EBM. One alternative to EBM is the basic science
approach: studying the physiological mechanisms of the
body and the biochemical properties of drugs. We think
that EBM is clearly not a paradigm shift in relation to this.
As we will explain more fully in section four, EBM is so
clearly intertwined with and complementary to basic sci-
ence that it would make little sense to see EBM as a para-
digm shift away from basic science.
On the other hand, when we compare EBM with clinical
experience and observational studies, we do have a shift in
the sort of evidence that is most highly valued for diagno-
sis, therapy, and prognosis questions. Clinical experience
and observational studies have much in common with
each other and with RCTs. In all three cases, physicians
attempt to answer the question of whether intervention X
is effective for condition Y, and they do so by trying X in a
certain number of cases and see whether it works. If a phy-
sician relies on her clinical experience, she reflects on past
cases that were similar in certain respects and in which
intervention X was tried. Observational studies are anBMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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attempt to make this more systematic: a large number of
patients with Y are given intervention X, and the results
are observed and summarized. This improves upon unsys-
tematic clinical experience because it avoids some prob-
lems of bias or selective memory. RCTs take clinical
experience several steps further by imposing fairly elabo-
rate controls.
So, the move to RCTs certainly constitutes a shift in some
of the techniques of medical researchers. The move also
reflects a change in some beliefs as well, for it reflects a
change of view about the reliability of uncontrolled stud-
ies or clinical experience. So in moving from clinical expe-
rience to RCTs, we do have a change in many of the
elements which make up a paradigm, according to Kuhn.
Is the change enough to count as a paradigm shift? That is
difficult to say, and we don't think the difficulty can be
resolved by a more detailed description of the changes in
medical research brought about by RCTs. The difficulty
lies in the fundamental unclarity of the Kuhnian notion of
a paradigm.
The question is this: at what point do changes in theory
and practice of science amount to a paradigm shift? Where
is the dividing line between changing one's beliefs and
practices within a paradigm and moving to a new para-
digm? If we do not have any idea what sort of dividing line
there might be, then it is not clear that talk of paradigms
comes to anything at all. The move to RCTs changed con-
siderably the specific techniques behind studies of treat-
ment effectiveness. On the other hand, there was no
immense change in doctrines. Instead, there was a recog-
nition of the fact that evidence gathered through clinical
experience and observational studies was subject to a
number of flaws: expectation effects (on the part of both
the patients and the physicians), the fact that most medi-
cal conditions improve regardless of treatment, etc. So was
this sufficient to count as a paradigm shift? Absent a
clearer dividing line or a clear account of the point of call-
ing some advances paradigm shifts, we suggest that any
answer to this question would be arbitrary and the exer-
cise pointless.
On behalf of Kuhn, one might suggest that a scientific
community employs a revolutionary new paradigm pre-
cisely when the new theory and practice are incommensu-
rable with the old. However, this suggestion creates two
problems: one for the proponent of EBM specifically; and
one for Kuhn's account more generally. The first problem
is this: it is simply not credible to think that the theory and
practices introduced by EBM are incommensurable with
the previous practices and theory. Two theories would be
incommensurable if they are untranslatable – i.e., if there
are significant statements within each theory that cannot
be translated at all into the language of the other theory.
Thus neither theory could be completely understood
using only the terms and concepts of the language of the
other theory. Accordingly, incommensurability suggests
that scientists working under distinct paradigms would
not be able to comprehend one another's claims. How-
ever, by this standard, it seems clear that there is no
incommensurability between medical research as prac-
ticed before EBM and medical research after the emphasis
on RCTs. Physicians working under each of the suppos-
edly different paradigms would have no trouble under-
standing one another's claims. Any number of extant texts
[14,20,21] describe the theory and practice of EBM, and
the description is couched in terms that would be fully
comprehensible to a medical researcher in the early 1940s
– prior to the first well publicized randomized controlled
trial. Physicians can also understand and benefit from
observations made centuries ago e.g. in physical diagno-
sis. So, if we adopt incommensurability as the indicator of
a revolutionary paradigm shift, then we have no reason to
say that EBM constitutes such a shift.
The second problem with Kuhn's talk of incommensura-
bility is that it is by no means obvious that there have
been any new scientific theories that can be seen as genu-
inely incommensurable with the previous theories. After
all, when Kuhn himself describes various alleged para-
digm shifts, he always manages to tell us about both the
old and the new scientific theories. Were his theory cor-
rect, this means he would have succeeded in doing that
which is impossible. While the issues are too deep and
complicated to be adequately addressed here, we will just
say that Kuhn and his followers have not convinced us
that the notion of incommensurable paradigms is even
coherent.[22]
Why it matters
It seems to us that when proponents grandly describe
EBM as a paradigm shift, they not only make a philosoph-
ical mistake, but they inadvertently have an unfortunate
effect on the debate about the first order questions, for
talk of paradigm shifts unduly polarizes the debate about
the value of EBM.[23] Recall that Kuhn describes a para-
digm as the "entire constellation of beliefs, values, tech-
niques, and so on shared by the members of a given
community".[19] When proponents of EBM suggest that
it is a new paradigm, this certainly fosters the impression
that an entire set of beliefs, values, and techniques is to be
left behind, and that the whole world of medical research
and clinical practice is completely different than it was in
the days before EBM was recognized. This in turn strongly
suggests that physicians have a stark choice: accept the
new regime and completely reject the old, or defensively
hold on to the old and reject EBM entirely. If something
as grand as a complete shift of paradigm is in the offing,
then the old physicians, with their old understandings,BMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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training, and paradigm, are relics to be removed as soon
as possible. The prospect of this kind of consequence
would certainly lead to a defensive retrenchment and even
anxiety. If you exaggerate the claims for EBM, you inten-
sify the natural defensiveness of those who feel them-
selves not to be completely in line with the new regime.
This is not a productive atmosphere in which to hold a
debate about the merits of EBM.
In the next section, we suggest a different philosophical
framework with which to examine the EBM debate. But
we think that some progress would be made simply by
avoiding overly broad definitions of EBM and by aban-
doning all talk of paradigm shifts.
Quine and the web of belief
We can make more progress by turning away from Kuhn
and turning to the work of philosopher of science, W.V.
Quine. Quine describes the totality of our beliefs – from
ordinary common sense claims to the laws of physics – as
a web, and he thus speaks of the web of belief. [12] A web,
e.g., a spider web, has an exterior edge or frame, and an
interior, consisting of radii and connecting points. At the
edges, the web is secured to an already existing structure,
e.g., a branch or wall. According to the analogy, the web
of belief comprises statements; certain of the statements
are closer to the periphery or frame, which consists of our
sensory experience.
Those sentences that lie closest to the periphery of the web
Quine calls observation sentences, while the interior of the
web contains more theoretical claims. The observation
sentences are those that are more likely to be denied or
affirmed on the basis of immediate sensory experience.
For example, a quick glance out of the window will deter-
mine whether or not we accept the sentence "It is raining."
With other sentences, we are much less immediately influ-
enced by sensory experiences. For example, consider the
sentence, "Ronald Reagan was President in 1987." One
might have a sensory experience that is apparently at odds
with this sentence; one might see a list that includes Wal-
ter Mondale as the 41st  President serving from 1985
through 1988. But we would not allow such apparently
recalcitrant sensory experience to change our minds about
the original sentence. We would conclude instead that the
list was simply wrong. This is not to say that the sentence
"Ronald Reagan was president in 1987" is immune from
all possibility of doubt; sufficient evidence might indeed
convince us that the sentence is false. But two points are
in order. First, it would take much more than a simple
one-time observation of anything, and, second, we would
have to change many other beliefs as well. This is charac-
teristic of theoretical sentences within the sciences too: to
convince us of the falsity of a firmly accepted claim, we
will need repeated experiments with congruent results,
and rejection of theoretical sentences typically requires
the revision of many other related beliefs. Some theoreti-
cal claims will be even closer to the center of the web, e.g.,
laws of nature like "E=mc2" and laws of logic or mathe-
matics. According to Quine, even claims as central as these
are revisable. But because such claims are connected to so
many other beliefs, their rejection would typically require
revision to many, many sentences within the web.
So according to the Quinean metaphor, we use a vast net-
work or web of beliefs with intricate logical and evidential
relations; at the periphery of the web are the observation
sentences, which represent claims that are the most
dependent on sensory observation. In the medical con-
text, observation sentences would include simple findings
during a physical examination, e.g., a patient's tempera-
ture or blood pressure. Moving inward from the periphery
of the web would be hypotheses about these findings, e.g.,
that the patient has an infection, or that if the systolic
pressure is 160 mmHg, we should repeat the measure-
ment before concluding that it represents that patient's
normal blood pressure. Even further towards the interior
of the web would be theories about disease occurrence,
e.g., that HIV is a retrovirus that targets CD4(+) T cells;
that the differential diagnosis of hypertension includes
idiopathic, renal stenosis and even pheochromocytoma;
even further in the interior would be very general claims,
e.g., the physiological model for elevated blood pressure
or the germ theory of disease.
It is important to note that Quine is not suggesting a foun-
dationalist picture, according to which we build our the-
ory on supposedly indubitable reports of sensory
experience. Quine writes:
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we
make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the sys-
tem. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be
held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading
hallucination or by amending certain statements of the
kind called logical laws.[12]
One of Quine's central claims is "that our statements
about the external world face the tribunal of sense experi-
ence not individually but only as a corporate body".[12]
Thus our theories are put to the test as a whole; we cannot
simply test individual claims in isolation from the rest of
our theory. This Quinean view, which seems to us per-
fectly correct, is sometimes referred to as holism, or as the
Quine-Duhem thesis (for Pierre Duhem had argued for a
similar view.[24]).
Nonetheless, observation sentences do have a certain priv-
ileged status. Observation sentences are those that are
most directly tied to our immediate sensory experience;BMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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given the right sensory experience, all competent observ-
ers fluent in our language will unhesitatingly assent to the
appropriate observation sentence. For example, while
looking at a thermometer, all competent observers could
agree that it reads 37.0 C.; and given the right visual, aural,
and tactile stimuli while using a sphygmomanometer, all
competent medical professionals could agree that the
patient's blood pressure is 130/80 mmHg at the time of
the measurement. Having made such observations, we
will also be very reluctant to change our minds about the
truth of those sentences. Of course, we might well come to
conclude that the patient's blood pressure has changed, or
that the reading does not represent the patient's normal
blood pressure (if, for example, we had reason to think
that the patient was under stress at the time). However,
having made our observation, we will remain quite confi-
dent that the original reading was correct at the time. Nat-
urally, we might be forced by other observations to
conclude that we had misread the sphygmomanometer,
the cuff was wrongly inflated, or even that the instrument
was not functioning properly. But in general, we will be
very reluctant to reject a previously accepted observation
sentence. Our developing scientific theory must somehow
accommodate the observation sentences we accept. In this
sense, sensory experience and observation sentences are
the ultimate checkpoint for scientific theory; they are that
which secures the web to fixed ground.
Application to EBM and the alternatives
EBM is principally concerned with what we have called
intervention questions of the form, 'is X safe and effective for
condition Y?'. Answers to these questions will fit some-
where in the web of belief. They will clearly not be located
at the very center of the web like principles of mathemat-
ics or laws of physics; in the face of recalcitrant empirical
data (e.g., data from RCTs) we will revise our views about
treatment efficacy much more readily than we will recon-
sider what we take to be basic laws of nature. On the other
hand, answers to intervention questions will also not be
at the very periphery of the web, for questions about the
safety or efficacy of therapy are also clearly not answerable
by simple observation statements. With something as
complex as the human body, we will not be able to simply
observe the exact effect of a particular therapy. (Of course,
some people fail to understand this. Some people think
that they can just see that, e.g., their breast implant caused
some awful condition that developed subsequently. [25])
So questions about treatment efficacy and safety will not
be on the outer periphery of the web, though they will
also not lie too deeply in the interior.
What is the relationship between EBM and its alternatives,
as seen from the perspective of the Quinean metaphor of
the web of belief? The answer depends on which of the
alternatives we are considering. We'll first look at the third
alternative to EBM, namely, deduction from basic scien-
tific knowledge.
EBM and Basic Science
From our knowledge of human physiology, disease, and
pharmacology we might be able to infer whether a partic-
ular drug would be effective in treating a given condition.
With the basic science approach, we work up from our
knowledge of physiology and biochemistry to a predic-
tion of what will happen. Clinical trials essentially ignore,
or suspend temporarily, all of that and determine whether
a treatment works by trying  the treatment in a large
number of cases under controlled conditions.
Basic science and RCTs thus represent two different paths
to answering intervention questions. Seen explicitly in
terms of the web metaphor, RCTs seem to take the shortest
path possible from the periphery of the web towards the
mid-web space where clinical decisions are made. Within
the course of a clinical trial, we will make observation
statements that seem very directly relevant to our original
treatment question, for we will be observing clinical end-
points for other patients with condition Y when given
treatment X. The basic science approach, on the other
hand, looks rather different. On the basis of biochemistry
and physiology, we might predict certain clinical end-
points for patients with condition Y when given treatment
X. These predictions will be based on a very different set
of observation statements than those involved in RCTs.
The observation statements that ultimately support the
basic science approach will be those that support our
knowledge of biochemistry and physiology.
Although EBM and the basic sciences embody different
approaches, this does not mean that they are competitors.
In fact, the two approaches need each other; neither can
stand alone. This is perhaps easiest to see with basic sci-
ence. If basic science could give us perfect confidence in
the safety and efficacy of an intervention, then clinical tri-
als would indeed be theoretically superfluous. However,
we rarely, if ever, can be certain of both the safety and effi-
cacy of a treatment without clinical testing, for our knowl-
edge of the human body and how it interacts with the
environment is far from complete.
While it is perhaps less obvious, the method of clinical tri-
als is also not able to stand alone. RCTs can sometimes
give us confident answers to intervention questions even
when our basic scientific knowledge is insufficient for this
purpose (e.g., on many questions concerning diet and
exercise); however, this does not mean that RCTs are com-
pletely independent of basic science. If nothing else, a
controlled trial needs a hypothesis to test. Typically, treat-
ments will be suggested as candidates because of other
more basic scientific research. A classic case of this is theBMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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accidental discovery of penicillin by Alexander Fleming,
though Fleming himself initially paid little attention to
the possible therapeutic uses of the mold.[26] Contempo-
rary basic scientific work on thalidomide provides
another example.[27]
But there is also a more fundamental way in which RCTs
cannot stand apart from basic science. Even when a clini-
cal trial returns positive results in the treatment arm that
satisfy tests of statistical significance, we will have more
confidence in these results when they have some anteced-
ent biological plausibility.[28,29] Put more generally, we
would suggest that the degree of confidence appropriate
for a clinically tested claim is a function of both  the
strength of the clinical result and the claim's antecedent
biological plausibility. This relationship is perhaps
obscured by cases in which we understand very little
about the pharmacology of a drug (e.g., treatment of
ulcerative colitis with sulfasalazine). In such cases, it is
perfectly appropriate that strong clinical results yield a
reasonably high degree of confidence. But we shouldn't
forget that we would be even more confident if the results
were exactly what biochemistry and physiology would
lead us to expect.
More importantly yet, if the basic sciences gave us very
strong reason to believe that a drug would not be effective,
then it is appropriate to be very cautious when interpret-
ing apparently positive clinical results. For example, there
have been some RCTs of homeopathic remedies accord-
ing to which subjects receiving the homeopathic remedy
did better than those receiving a placebo, and where the
P-values are less than .05 or even less than .001.[30] How-
ever, given that homeopathic remedies are typically com-
posed of nothing more than water, accepted basic science
should lead us to seriously doubt that these 'drugs' can be
effective. In any event, we cannot simply accept that pure
water (in the form of a homeopathic medicine) is medi-
cally effective unless we are also willing to revise much of
our basic scientific conception of chemistry and the body.
The interior of the web acts as a compass we use to inter-
pret the direction we should take from signals from a new
RCT. Statistical information from an RCT is virtually uninter-
pretable and meaningless if stripped away from the backdrop of
our basic understanding of physiology and biochemistry. The
dependence of RCTs upon the backdrop of basic science is
unsurprising from the Quinean perspective. The point is
essentially an application of the Quinean doctrine of
holism, the claim that our theories are put to the test as
whole bodies rather than being tested sentence by sen-
tence. (Tonelli and Callahan [31] make a similar point
about the need for theory in interpreting empirical results.
However, they suggest that evidence concerning alterna-
tive medicine should be weighed and interpreted in terms
of its theory of disease, e.g., theories involving undetecta-
ble spirit essences or the like. This does not follow at all.
If we are judging the effectiveness of alternative medicinal
therapies, then we evaluate the evidence in light of the
theory about disease that we believe to be true. It would
be a silly and pointless exercise to evaluate evidence in
light of a theory we believe to be false.)
The dependence of RCTs on basic science appears not
always to have been fully appreciated by some EBM pro-
ponents. In some discussions of hierarchies of medical
evidence, basic physiology and biochemistry is put at the
very bottom or is ignored altogether.[14,32] Thus, these
proponents of EBM seem to say that we should only look
at evidence from RCTs (when we have it), and that medi-
cal practice is conducted in isolation of our understanding
of physiology and biochemistry. We claim that such views
are wrong. On the other hand, this is not to say that if a
clinical result flies in the face of our physiological under-
standing that we should just reject it out of hand, as sug-
gested by Couto [5]. In general, given the complexity of
the human body and our nascent knowledge of it, if we
use basic science alone to judge the safety or efficacy of an
intervention, then our judgment will be fraught with a
high degree of uncertainty. For example, some laboratory
evidence suggests that estrogen might have a positive
effect on brain cells, and thus suggesting that hormone
therapy might help to ward off dementia. However, a
recent controlled trial strongly suggests that whatever pos-
itive effect such hormones have, these effects are out-
weighed by negative effects.[33] On the other hand, in an
extreme case like homeopathy, where the biological plau-
sibility is so low, our background biological knowledge
does and should affect our interpretation of the evidence
from RCTs.
The outcome of our discussion above is that basic science
and EBM are deeply intertwined within the web and com-
plementary. In Quinean terms, each of these represents a
different path to the intervention question through the
web of belief. We clearly need both approaches. Which of
the approaches should receive the greater share of our lim-
ited health care resources? There is little useful to be said
about this question at this level of generality. The best
allocation of resources is affected by a broad range of con-
textual factors.
EBM and the other alternatives
As noted earlier in the discussion of Kuhn, clinical experi-
ence, observational studies, and RCTs have much in com-
mon. All are attempting to ascertain the safety and efficacy
of interventions, and all do so by trying the intervention
and noting the results. From the Quinean perspective, we
could also say that all three are anchored to observation
statements at the periphery of the web in similar ways. In
each case, we will observe the treatment received by aBMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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patient, and then we will observe the outcome or end-
point for each patient. Of course, in an RCT, we place
restrictions on the way data are gathered: we require that
there be a control group of patients who do not receive the
target experimental therapy, and that patients are ran-
domly assigned to either the control or experimental
group; we typically 'blind' researchers (and other partici-
pants), by not allowing them to know, during the course
of the study, which patients are in the control group; and
we blind the patients themselves, so that they do not
know which therapy they received. In this section, we will
look at how these restrictions are to be understood and
justified from the perspective of the Quinean metaphor.
In observational studies or clinical experience, the physi-
cian knows which subjects received the therapy or expo-
sure, and then observes the patient's subsequent
condition. Thus, statements about the patient's condition
constitute the evidential base, and these statements are
treated as observation sentences. But recall that an obser-
vation sentence is one that would elicit assent from any
competent observer. The advocate of double-blind trials
contends, in effect, that simple statements about the
patients' condition are not observation sentences after all,
for the sentence might not elicit assent from all competent
observers – especially for 'soft' end points such as pain
scales. Physicians may be unconsciously biased in favor of
seeing or eliciting a treatment effect when none exists. A
doctor who knows that the patient has received a certain
therapy, and who thinks that the therapy is likely to be
effective, might make observations that would not be
made by a physician who knew nothing of the treatment.
So the criticism of clinical experience and observational
studies is this: the evidence in those cases is tainted in that
physicians take certain sentences about the patient's con-
dition to be observation sentences (and hence firm check-
points) when in fact they do not qualify as observation
sentences. Hence, according to the proponent of EBM, the
conclusions reached through clinical experience are less
reliable.
In a double-blind trial, we also blind patients from infor-
mation about what sort of therapy they received. Here, the
main concern is not that the patients will be subcon-
sciously biased in reporting their condition – though this
might be a concern in some cases. The issue is very differ-
ent: we want to rule out placebo effects (or the "meaning
response" [34]), meaning that we want exclude the possi-
bility that the observed effect stemmed from the patient's
belief that she was given a particular therapy. We might
have reliable observation sentences about the patient's
subsequent condition, but, unless we control for placebo
effects, the improvement in a patient's condition might
have nothing to do with the actual treatment received. In
Quinean terms, in an uncontrolled study, the observation
statements (about the patient's condition) and the theo-
retical statement (about the efficacy of the treatment) may
be linked too tenuously along the radii of the web; in the
extreme case, the apparent linkage may be purely by
chance. If we control the conditions under which we make
observations, we can then compare the observation state-
ments concerning the condition of patients who received
the treatment with statements concerning patients who
received a placebo. In other words, we use observation
sentences similar to those that would be obtained in clin-
ical experience, but we are more careful in the inferences
we draw from these statements. The EBM proponent con-
tends that by including observations about patients in the
control group, we put ourselves on firmer ground in deter-
mining the efficacy of the treatment; thus the web is
strengthened.
Perhaps the most basic feature of an RCT is the use of ran-
domized control groups. When research is done without
using control groups at all, researchers might infer treat-
ment was effective, when in fact the patient's condition
would have waned on its own or would have improved
just as much with the standard therapy. In other words,
the EBM proponent claims that in the absence of a control
group, the inference from observation statements (about
the patient's condition) to the conclusion (about the effi-
cacy of the intervention) is greatly weakened. Moreover, if
we do not randomly assign patients to either the experi-
mental or control groups, then we again run the risk of
researcher bias affecting the outcome, e.g., by selecting
patients for the experimental group who have the best
chance of improvement.
Returning to the first-order, normative question, we can
now ask to what extent should physicians rely on RCTs as
opposed to clinical experience or observational studies.
Unlike the comparison with basic science, we cannot sim-
ply say that they are complementary and that we need
both. As discussed above, observational studies essentially
are clinical experience made systematic, and RCTs are
observational studies subject to further controls. The extra
time and expense involved in performing RCTs is justified
only if their answers to intervention questions are more
likely to be true. For the reasons laid out in the preceding
paragraphs, the proponent of EBM contends that RCTs are
indeed more reliable than the alternatives. We are
inclined to agree. It is clear that for clinical experience and
observational studies, there is a risk of different sorts of
bias; in Quinean terms, the controls imposed by RCTs
give us firmer observational checkpoints and stronger
inferences from observations to conclusions, particular
conclusions about interventions. Experience confirms
that uncontrolled studies can give different results than
RCTs [35,36]; the Quinean analysis gives a diagnosis of
those differences.BMC Health Services Research 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/3/14
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Still, that doesn't mean we should reject clinical experi-
ence or observational studies altogether. Much of our web
of medical theory was spun from these sources. Moreover,
as a number of authors have pointed out, there are signif-
icant limitations on when RCTs are practical or even ethi-
cal. Where limitations of this sort intervene, we have to do
the best we can, and that means relying on the experience
we have through observational studies and clinical experi-
ence, even though we know that there may be problems
of bias and selective memory, etc. If there are EBM propo-
nents who thinks that medical practice can be reduced to
an algorithmic application of evidence from RCTs, they
are certainly mistaken.[37]
Summary
Because we wished to clarify the debate about EBM, we
have spent the bulk of this paper exploring the second-
order conceptual questions concerning the nature of EBM.
We have argued that it is both a philosophical and practi-
cal mistake to see EBM as a paradigm shift. We have also
attempted to explain the differences between EBM and its
alternatives in terms of Quine's metaphor of the web of
belief. EBM and the basic sciences offer different paths
through the web to claims about intervention safety and
efficacy: each begins with a very different set of observa-
tion statements as its evidential checkpoint; however, nei-
ther is completely self-standing and independent. There is
a sharper contrast between EBM and the methods of clin-
ical experience and observational studies, according to the
EBM proponent: uncontrolled studies take certain reports
of clinical endpoints as observation sentences – i.e., sen-
tences that would be agreed to by all competent observers,
sentences that are the checkpoint and basis for science –
when in fact some of those reports do not count as obser-
vation sentences; and in other cases, uncontrolled studies
may base their conclusions on observation sentences that
are too tenuously linked to the claimed result, resulting in
a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. This does not mean that
RCTs are always appropriate or are always feasible, and
there is much more to be said about the first order ques-
tions of when RCTs are worth the time and expense. But
we can only have that discussion when we are clear about
the nature of the questions themselves.
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